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Trust in International Organizations: An Empirical Investigation
Focusing on the United Nations
Summary
The literature on social capital has strongly increased in the last two decades, but there
still is a lack of substantial empirical evidence about the determinants of international
trust. This empirical study analyses a cross-section of individuals, using micro-data
from the World Values Survey, covering 38 countries, to investigate trust in
international organizations, specifically in the United Nations. In line with previous
studies on international trust we find that political trust matters. We also find that social
trust is relevant, but contrary to previous studies the results are less robust. Moreover,
the paper goes beyond previous studies investigating also the impact of geographic
identification, corruption and globalization. We find that a higher level of (perceived)
corruption reduces the trust in the UN in developed countries, but increases trust in
developing and transition countries. A stronger identification with the world as a whole
also leads to a higher trust in the UN and a stronger capacity to act globally in economic
and political environment increases trust in the UN.
Keywords: International Organizations, United Nations, International Trust, Political
Trust, Social Trust, Corruption, Globalization
JEL Classification: Z130, D730, O190

Address for correspondence:
Benno Torgler
The School of Economics and Finance
Queensland University of Technology
GPO Box 2434
Brisbane QLD 4001
Australia
E-mail: benno.torgler@qut.edu.au

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper51

2

Torgler: Trust in International Organizations: An Empirical Investiga

2

1 Introduction

Social capital has been studied by many different disciplines. It has advanced to an important
concept in social sciences, enforcing the interdisciplinary discourse between researchers and
policy makers and non-academic institutions such as the World Bank with its Social Capital
Initiative on the other hand. Moreover it also encouraged the discussion within the single
disciplines (see Woolcock 1998). Many authors have singled out social capital as an
important feature of productive social relationships (Gambetta, 1988; Hardin, 1993) and
effective governance facilitating also coordinated actions and the willingness to comply (see,
e.g., Putnam, 1993; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Knack and Keefer, 1997, La Porta et al.,
1999; Knack, 1999; Zak and Knack, 2001 and Schaltegger and Torgler, 2007; Torgler,
2007)1. However, Brewer et al. (2004) point out that “To date, no research has directly studied
international trust” (p. 94). The authors stress the relevance of scholars casting their attention
not just on the familiar forms of trust, but on other forms as well. Political scientists have also
shown that public opinion about world affairs can influence voting behavior and public policy
(Aldrich et al. 1989 and Shapiro and Jacobs 2000). To measure international trust Brewer et
al. (2004, 2005) use the following questions: Generally speaking, would you say that the
United States can trust other nations, or that the United States can’t be too careful in dealing
with other nations? Would you say that most of the time other nations try to be helpful to the
United Sates, or that they are just looking out for themselves? Thus, the authors extend
previous studies that focused on generalized trust by including an international dimension. In
a similar approach we extend the previous studies and focus on individuals’ trust in
international organizations. Trust in international organization can be seen as a sub-category
of international trust. It is connected to particularized trust relying in our case strongly on
1

For an overview about the topic social capital and politics see also Jackman and Miller (1998).
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experiences with the United Nations (or knowledge about such experiences). Contrary to
Brewer et al. (2004, 2005) who used US data our data set from the World Values Survey
wave III (1995-1997) covers 38 countries. Moreover, we do not focus on the general level of
international trust but rather on a particular international institution, namely the United
Nations. The UN include 191 sovereign states, representing virtually every country in the
world, and therefore are a global association of governments aiming at facilitating cooperation in international law, international security, economic development, and social
equity (see http://www.un.org/)2. It is highly relevant to investigate what shapes the
confidence in the UN, as such international institutions have received substantial and
increased attention in the debates over world affairs (Brewer et al., 2004). As the next section
will show we also try to extend the previous empirical model investigating factors such as
corruption, geographic identification and globalization. In addition, we are also going to
investigate different dimensions of political trust instead of focusing only on trust in the
government and to use an instrumental approach to deal with possible endogeneity problems.
Section 2 of the paper provides the theoretical framework. Section 3 introduces the
data and measures. Section 4 then presents the empirical findings and Section 5 finishes with
some concluding remarks.

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Political Trust
The starting point of our theoretical framework are the studies by Brewer et al. (2004, 2005)
which stress that not only the international, but also the domestic political environment affects
2

It should be noted that Switzerland and Serbia, included in our data set, were not members at the time the
survey was conducted. Switzerland joined the UN in 2002, Serbia in 2000.
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international trust or trust in an international organization. The social capital literature has
stressed the important consequences of social and institutional trust for mass political
judgments covering also world affairs (see, e.g., Brewer et al., 2004; Brewer and Steenbergen,
2002). The current situation in a country may affect the level of trust in international
organizations. Brewer et al. (2004) stress that citizens who are cynical about domestic politics
should be cynical about international relations as well (p. 97) and therefore might be cynical
as well about international institutions. Citizens who believe that their own government does
not fulfill their expectations may reason that international organizations may even be less able
to satisfy their preferences. Thus, the authors hypothesize that Americans who have high
values of political trust are more likely to believe that the United States can generally trust
other nations than those with low values. The results indicate that social and political trust
have a strong impact on international trust. As a proxy for political trust, Brewer et al. (2004,
2005) use trust in the government. This approach is in line with previous studies (Miller,
1974; Hetherington, 1998) but neglects further possible dimensions. Thus, instead of focusing
entirely on trust in the government, we are going to investigate further dimensions of political
trust. On the one hand side, there is a variable that focuses on trust at the constitutional level
(trust in the legal system), thereby focusing on how the relationship between the state and its
citizens is established. On the other hand, we will investigate trust variables at the current
politico-economic process level using not only trust in the government, but also trust in the
parliament and the political parties. We also predict in our case trust externalities from the
country to the international level and therefore develop the following first core hypothesis:

Core hypothesis 1:

A higher degree of trust in its own nation’s institutions (legal system,
government, political parties and parliament), increases ceteris
paribus trust in the UN.

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2007
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2.2 Social Trust

Moreover, in line with Brewer et al. (2004, 2005) we argue that individuals may derive their
trust in international organizations from even more general forms of trust. Citizens’ trust in
organizations may be based on their assumptions about other people. Individuals with a
higher social trust might be less xenophobic (see Uslaner, 2002; Brewer et al., 2004). Several
previous studies have suggested that beliefs about human nature affect foreign policy attitudes
(see, e.g., Sniderman and Citrin, 1971; Conover and Feldman, 1984, and Bartels, 1995).
Foreign policy decisions and evaluations are complex. Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) argue
that individuals will turn to their beliefs about human nature when they need to make foreign
policy judgments: “Just as social circumstances force people to make judgments about the
trustworthiness of others, the task of making foreign policy judgments should compel citizens
to make judgments about the trustworthiness of international actors …In lieu of specific
knowledge, then, they may translate their general trust (or distrust) in the people around them
into specific trust (or distrust) in international actors” (pp. 42-43). This interpretation is near
to Herbert Simon’s (1955) theory of satisficing. In decisive situations, where someone does
not know much about the possibilities of action and their consequences, the concept of the
“bounded rationality” gains importance. Following a specific rule helps economize on the cost
of information. A person with a strong trust in others and therefore human nature may believe
that the key players at the UN have good intentions and will not try to take advantage of their
position. On the other hand, a person who is cynical about others and human nature in general
may also distrust the leading figures of the UN believing that they act selfishly and do not
pursue citizens’ preferences (see also Brewer and Steenbergen, 2002). Thus, we can develop
our second core hypothesis:

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper51
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Core hypothesis 2:

A higher level of generalized trust increases ceteris paribus trust in the
UN.

2.3 Corruption

It may be interesting to investigate additional variables that approximate state’s capacity. Not
only political trust may influence trust in international organizations, but also countries’
perceived institutional quality. As a proxy we will investigate the impact of (perceived)
corruption. In line with hypothesis one, it is possible to argue that a higher perceived
corruption may lead to a lower trust in international organizations. On the other hand, one can
argue individuals may hope for alternative channels to resolve problems in dysfunctional
states and regions. The argument may be valid for developing and especially transition
countries. This may lead to a higher trust in the UN rather than a lower trust. Western
societies are less dependent on the functioning of an international organization as its
governance and institutional quality is higher. Moreover, developed countries offer many
viable channels for citizens to take action and express their preferences. The democratic
structure allows individuals to a certain extent to control and influence the government. The
government has therefore a stronger incentive to take into account citizens’ preferences.
Moreover, one can argue that developed countries have had longer experiences with
international organizations and therefore their citizens may have a better knowledge of
possible failures of an organization such as the UN, as they have better access to international
information. It may be interesting to differentiate between developed and developing or
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transition countries when investigating corruption3. We therefore develop the following two
hypotheses:

Core hypothesis 3:

A higher level of (perceived) corruption reduces ceteris paribus trust in
the UN in developed countries.

Core hypothesis 4:

A higher level of (perceived) corruption increases ceteris paribus trust
in the UN in developing and transition countries.

To test these hypotheses we run specifications for different regions. Moreover, the regional
dummy variables in the pooled estimations will show whether there are also different regional
trust levels.

2.4. Geographic Identification

We can also expect that geographic identification should affect international trust and more
particularly trust in the UN. This is a relatively unexplored aspect in the literature. A stronger
identification with the world as a whole may induce higher preference to establish and
preserve international organizations. On the other hand, individuals strongly attached to the
local area might be more skeptical about the usefulness of an international organization. Thus,
the following hypothesis can be developed:

Core hypothesis 5:

The more extensive the citizens’ identification with the world as a
whole, the higher ceteris paribus the trust in the UN.

3

Interestingly, Dreher and Schneider (2006) find the tendency that shadow economy and corruption are

substitutes in high income countries while in low income countries these factors are complements.
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5. Globalization
The international environment that a country faces might be a key factor as well. Countries’
capacity to act globally by creating international networks guaranteeing information, goods
and capital flows increase the demand for international stability and the avoidance of a
dangerous international environment. A safe environment guarantees that the international
network is maintained. Such conditions may foster trust in international organizations as the
UN. However, the level of trust may also depend on the extent to which the UN is in fact able
to promote peace, security, and economic development. The literature on globalization has
investigated its impact on growth, government outlays and taxes or consumption (for an
overview see Dreher 2006), but has strongly neglected its impact on social capital or on
international trust and trust in international organizations. To investigate this question we will
work with an interesting data set provided by Dreher (2006) that differently from other studies
provides an overall measure of globalization, covering several dimensions of globalization by
using 23 variables. This allows to usefully investigate empirically the impact of globalization
on international trust4. We will try the following core hypothesis:

Core hypothesis 6:

The more extensive countries’ capacity to act globally, the higher
ceteris paribus the trust in the UN.

To provide an overview of this paper’s contribution, we present in Figure 1 a model of
international trust. We use international trust as the dependent factor taking into account that
we define trust in the international organizations as a sub-category of international trust. On
the top left hand side we find the suggested model of Brewer et al. (2004. 2005). Key factors
in this model are social and political trust, party identification and ideology. On the right hand
4

Our specifications will have enough degrees of freedom at the country level to be able to consider an
aggregated country variable in the regression.
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side we show how we first extend this previous model, including also factors such as
corruption and geographic identification. Moreover, we also provide a model that takes into
account that the international environment a country is facing may influence international
trust. In particular, we extend the model investigating to which extent country’s capacity to
act globally affects international trust.

Figure 1:
A Model of International Trust

Independent Variables of the Brewer et al.
(2004, 2005) Model: Predispositions: Social
Trust, Political Trust, Party Identification,
Ideology
Demographics: Gender, Race, Age, Education,

First Extensions: Corruption, Geographic
Identification (Cosmopolitan), Political Interest,
Religiosity, Risk Attitudes
Demographics: Employment and Marital Status

Second Extension: International environment facing one’s country:
- Countries’ capacity to act globally by creating international networks guaranteeing information, goods and
capital flows (globalization at the economic, political and social level)

3 Data and Empirical Model
3.1 World Values Survey and Dependent Variable

The data used in the present study are taken from the World Values Survey, a worldwide
investigation of socio-cultural and political change, based on representative national samples.

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper51
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It was first carried out in 1981-83, and subsequently in 1990-91, 1995-96 and 1999-2001.
Data from these surveys are made publicly available for use by researchers interested in how
views change with time. The researchers who conduct and administer the World Values
Survey (WVS) in their respective countries are required to follow the methodological
requirements of the World Values Association. Surveys are generally based on national
representative samples of at least 1000 individuals, ages 18 and over (although sometimes
people under the age of 18 participate). The samples are selected using probability random
methods and the questions in the national surveys generally do not deviate far from the
original official questionnaire.5 We will use a data set that covers 38 countries and focus on
the third instead of the fourth wave, as in the latter not all independent variables relevant to
our study have been collected (e.g., perceived corruption). The World Values Survey offers
the great opportunity to investigate a broad set of possible determinants. The question on trust
in the UN is phrased as follows:

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how
much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of
confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The United Nations.

Our dependent variable TRUST IN UN has the value 4 for a great deal of confidence and 1
for none at all.
We will use an ordered probit model to analyze the ranking information of the scaled
dependent variable. A weighting variable has been applied to correct the samples and thus to
get a reflection of the national distribution. Moreover, the original weight variable was
multiplied by a constant for each country to get an equal number of weighted observations
(around 1500) for each survey. The World Values Survey provides the weighting variable.
5

A typical World Values Survey can be viewed at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
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Countries with fewer than 750 observations (Montenegro, the Dominican Republic, Ghana,
Pakistan, and Tambov) were excluded from the sample to reduce possible biases due to a lack
of representativeness. Several other countries were excluded, as they don’t provide
information regarding the dependent and independent variables integrated in our estimations6.
Finally, Sweden could not be included as one of the control variables (education) is coded
differently. We proceed with a sample of 38 countries7. The estimations are also performed
for various geographic sub-samples to compare the relevance of our independent variables in
different environments.

3.2 Key Independent Variables

a) Political Trust and Social Trust at the Country Level
As mentioned in the previous section we are going to investigate different dimensions of
political trust. Brewer et al. (2004, 2005) proxied political trust focusing on an index that
measures trust in the government8. The questions we are using in this study are:
Could you tell me how much confidence you have in:
-

the legal system

-

government in your capital

-

parliament

-

political parties

6

These countries are Poland, Japan, South Africa, Puerto Rico, China, Columbia.
Western Europe Countries & USA & Australia (USA, Western Germany, Eastern Germany, Switzerland,
Australia, Norway, Finland, Spain), CEE and FSU (Bulgaria, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, Armenia, Russia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina),
Latin America (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay) Asia (South Korea, India, Taiwan,
China, Philippines, Bangladesh), Africa (Nigeria).
8
Questions: How much of the time can you trust the government in Washington to do what is right?”. “Would
you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for
the benefit of all the people?” Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked,
not very many are or do you think hardly any of them are crooked?”, and “Do you think that people in the
government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste very much of it?”.
7
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Do you have a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or
no confidence at all? (4=a great deal of confidence to 1=no confidence at all). We are going
to use all single factors but will also use a POLITICAL TRUST INDEX (average of all
factors).
To measure social trust, we will use a standard question that measures generalized
trust (see, e.g., Uslaner 2002):
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too
careful in your dealings with people? (1=most people can be trusted, 0=can’t be too careful).

b) Corruption
To assess the level of (perceived) corruption from the WVS, we use the following question:
How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country?
Almost no public officials are engaged in it (1)
A few public officials are engaged in it (2)
Most public officials are engaged in it (3)
Almost all public officials are engaged in it (4)
The variable perceived corruption is in line with other indexes such as the Transparency
International that also measures perceptions. However, perceptions are neither objective nor
quantitative measures of the actual degree of corruption. It is an indirect way of measuring
corruption (Tanzi, 2002). Analyzing the Transparency International Index Treisman (2000,
pp. 410-411) finds though valid arguments why data based on perceptions should be taken
seriously. Components of the used surveys and ratings are highly correlated, although they
have been made with different methodologies, different inputs and in a different time period.
Such a consistency allows to conclude that factors are almost free of biases such as a
“temporal mood” or guesses. There is also a consistency in the Transparency International
over time, although the construction of the index varies over time. Finally, the index is
strongly correlated with other corruption indexes such as the ICRG, the BI or the Gallup
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International. Tanzi (2002) points out: “If corruption could be measured, it could probably be
eliminated” (p. 38). A good feature to test whether the World Values Survey question about
PERCEIVED CORRUPTION is a useful proxy is to check whether the variable is correlated
with other well-known indexes on corruption. Thus, we compare our variable with the
corruption indexes TI (Transparency International), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
and Quality of Government (Control of Corruption) developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi (2003). The World Values Survey Corruption ratings are highly correlated with the
TI (r= -0.878), the ICRG (r=-0.680) and the Quality of Government rating (r=-0.827)9.

c) Geographic Identification
To measure individuals’ perceptions to which geographic groups they belong first of all
(COSMOPOLITAN) we will use the following question:

To which of these geographic groups would you say you belong first of all? Locality or town
where you live (1), state or region of country where you live (2), country as a whole (3),
continent (4), the world as a whole (5).

d) Globalization
We are going to use data provided by Dreher (2006) that measure three main dimensions of
globalization: economic, social and political globalization. The overall index of globalization
covers not less than 23 variables. Interestingly, the data is available on a yearly basis for 125
countries over the period 1970-2003. A description of the sub-factors is presented in the
Appendix Table A1 and the methodology is explained in detail in Dreher (2006)10. We will

9

The sign is negative because for all three ratings used (TI, ICRG and Quality of Government), a higher score
corresponds to a lower corruption.
10
The data can be downloaded under http://www.kof.ch/globalization/download/globalization_2006_long.xls.
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use data from the year 1995. As not all of our 38 countries are covered in the data set, we will
include this variable sequentially in the specification.

3.2 Specification of the Test Equation

To test our core hypotheses in a cross-sectional model, we propose the following baseline
equation:

TRUSTUNis= α + β1 CTRLis +β2 SOCIALTRUSTis +β3 POLITTRUSTis+β3 CORRUPTis +
COSMOPOLis + GLOBALs + FEs+ εis

(1)

where is indexes and individual i in country s, TRUSTUNis denotes individuals’ trust in the
UN, SOCIALTRUSTis, POLITTRUSTis, CORRUPTis, COSMOPOLis , and GLOBALs are our
key variables social trust, political trust, (perceived) corruption, geographic identification
(cosmopolitan) and globalization. The regression also contains several control variables,
CTRLis, including factors such as education, interest in politics, ideology, economic
conditions, marital and employment status, risk attitudes, church attendance, age and gender.
Country fixed effects (FEs) and an error term (εis) complete the model. In some specifications
we are also going to include regional dummy variables for the CEE and FSU (Central and
Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union countries), LATIN AMERICA, ASIA and
AFRICA11, leaving the industrialized economies of WESTERN EUROPE, USA, and
AUSTRALIA in the reference group.
In order to fulfill the ceteris paribus conditions, we have to control for a number of
other important factors, which will be discussed in turn. First of all, we consider several
socio-demographic and economic variables. Table A1 in the Appendix provides a description
11

Only one country represents Africa (Nigeria).
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of these variables. Previous studies have shown the importance of these factors. For example,
Brewer et al. (2004) find a negative correlation between age and international trust. They
stress that the experiences older Americans have made during their formative years foster a
generalized distrust of other nations. Education has a positive and income a negative effect,
neither of them being statistically significant. We will use individuals’ self-classification into
various economic classes as a proxy for income because the ten-point income scale in the
WVS is based on national currencies and is therefore less apt for a cross-country comparison.
Moreover, income is coded on a scale from 1 to 10 and these income intervals are not fully
comparable across countries. In addition, it should also be noted that this variable has a high
amount of missing values.
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find that trust in others increases with age but at a
declining rate, and that women have a lower level of trust compared to men12. The authors
also find that income and education are positively correlated with trusting others, stressing
that professional success increases individuals’ trust in others. Glaeser et al. (2000) find
similar results, but stress that such findings have multiple interpretations. The positive effect
of education on trust may occur because more educated people are associated with other more
educated people who are trustworthier. On the other hand, education may raise social skills or
increase the possibilities to reward and punish other individuals. However, it can be argued
that not only formal education matters, but also informal education, such as, for example,
political interest. Compared to other determinants, the aspect of political interest has been
widely neglected in the social capital literature. Such a variable might be highly relevant when
focusing on trust in the UN13. Well-informed citizens may be better aware of the UN efforts,
which may support their trust in such an international organization. However, they are also in

12

They argue that groups that were historically discriminated have a lower level of trust.
We use the following question to measure political interest: How interested would you say you are in politics?
(4=very interested, 1= not all interested). The results remain robust when using alternative proxies such as
importance of politics (Question: How important is politics in your life (4= very important, 1= not at all
important).

13
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a better position to assess the efficiency of the UN which may have a positive or a negative
impact on their trust level, depending on how the UN act. We also control for marital and
employment status. For example, married people may have a higher level of institutional trust,
because they are more constrained by their social network and often strongly involved in the
community (Tittle, 1980)14. They furthermore might be more concerned with international
problems than singles as the “parent effect” makes them seek their children’s future welfare.
In the results of Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) marital status was uninfluential. On the other
hand, Glaeser et al. (2000) report that married persons are more trusting.
We also control for the level of risk aversion with a dummy variable. The aim of the
UN is among other things to maintain international peace and security and to cooperate in
solving

international,

social,

cultural

and

humanitarian

problems

(see

http://www.un.org/aboutun/basicfacts/unorg.htm). More risk averse individuals may have
higher preferences for such aims, which may help to create a higher level of identification and
trust. Moreover, controlling for risk attitudes allows to find better insights regarding the
variables age, gender, or economic situation. It could be argued that results related to the
socio-demographic and socio-economic factors may be driven by different risk attitude
functions. Hartog et al. (2002), for example, found in an empirical survey analysis that an
increase in income reduces risk aversion.
Moreover we control for religiosity. However, rather than asking about the degree of
religiosity directly, we include religiosity proxied by frequency of church attendance,15 which
approximates how much time individuals devote to religion, an aspect that traditional research
has so far neglected (Iannaccone, 2002). Interestingly, Alesina and La Ferrara find that
religious affiliation of the respondents did not affect trust. They conclude “that it may be the

14

However, it can be argued that a stronger involvement at the local level may lead to a stronger skepticism
toward international organizations that are more centralized.
15
Corresponding question: Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend religious
services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less
often, never or practically never. (7 = more than once a week to 1 = never or practically never)
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case that it is not the religious beliefs per se but the organized forms of religion in different
parts of the world that may influence differently social behavior” (p. 220). The frequency of
church attendance indicates that people devote time to religion. Both involve ties to others,
and religious activities might support the norms of a larger community (see Tittle and Welch,
1983). The church as an institution induces behavioral norms and moral constraints among
their community. Because religion can be seen as a proxy for such characteristics as work
ethic, tolerance, and trust (La Porta et al., 1999), it acts as a sanctioning system that
legitimizes and reinforces social values. Religious organizations thus provide moral social
constitutions and, to a certain extent, act as “supernatural police” that enforce accepted rules
(Anderson and Tollison 1992). Thus, religion has a comparative advantage in producing or
encouraging social goods in large cultures of intermediate complexity whose central
government is too weak to enforce property rights (Hull and Bold, 1994). The aims of the UN
are similar to the ones churches promote (dealing with social, cultural and humanitarian
problems etc.) and thus their influence may help to increase individuals’ trust in the UN. On
the other hand, similar purposes may lead to a certain level of competition, which would
reduce the level of trust in the UN.
Finally, we also control for ideology (RIGHTIST)16. Due to the high number of
missing values we include this variable sequentially in the specification. The literature for the
US has shown, for example, that Republicans and conservative political elites are more
pessimistic regarding the nature of international relations, taking into account that citizens
follow signals from political elites (Brewer et al., 2004).

16

In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale,
generally speaking? Scale from 1 to 10.
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4 Empirical Evidence
Table 1 presents the first empirical results. In the regressions we use country fixed effects to
take into account unobservable country specific characteristics. Moreover, since the equation
in an ordered probit model is nonlinear, only the signs of the coefficients can be directly
interpreted and not their sizes. Calculating the marginal effects is therefore a method to find
the quantitative effect of an independent variable. The marginal effect indicates the change in
the share of individuals (or the probability of) belonging to the highest trust in the UN level
when the independent variable increases by one unit. If the independent variable is a dummy
variable, the marginal effect is evaluated with regard to the reference group. Furthermore, “I
don’t know” answers and missing values were omitted from all estimations.
First we present an estimation including corruption, but neither generalized trust nor
trust in the state (see specification 1). In a second approach we include generalized trust (2).
The last two estimations include political trust, first as an index (3) and in a second step
including all single factors (4). We include social and political trust sequentially in the
estimations to meet any possible criticism of similarities with our dependent variables. The
first two specifications show that a higher level of perceived corruption leads to a lower level
of trust in the UN, which supports Brewer et al.’s (2004) argument that a lower level of
government quality reduces trust at the international level. The marginal effects indicate that
an increase in the perceived corruption scale by one unit reduces the probability of reporting
the highest trust in the UN by around 2.5 percentage points. However, once we control for
political trust, the coefficient is not statistically significant anymore. Looking at the
estimations (2) to (4), we can conclude in line with Brewer et al. (2004, 2005) that social trust
and political trust have a positive effect on trust at the international level. However, contrary
to Brewer et al. (2004, 2005) we find that generalized trust affects our dependent variable to a
lesser extent than political trust. The coefficient of generalized trust loses its significance after
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controlling for political trust. Table 1 shows that the impact of political trust is quite
substantial. An increase in the index by one unit raises the share of individuals at the highest
level of trust in the UN by 3.2 percentage points. The fourth estimation in Table 1 indicates
that all subcomponents are statistically significant with high marginal effects between 2.3 and
4.6 percentage points. The strongest effects are observable for the variables trust in the
parliament and trust in the legal system. These results indicate strong externalities. Political
trust at the state level leads to a higher trust at the international level. Thus, we can conclude
that hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected.
We also find a positive correlation between the variable cosmopolitan and trust in the
UN. The coefficient is always statistically significant although the marginal effects are not
comparable to the variable political trust. Nevertheless, the results indicate that hypothesis 5
cannot be rejected. The stronger citizens’ identification with the world as a whole, the higher
their trust in the UN.
The control variables show that all age groups from 30 to 65+ have a significantly
lower probability of trusting the UN than the reference group. The strongest effect is
observable for the age group 65+, followed by the group 30-49. Being in the highest age
group rather than the youngest one reduces the probability of stating that the UN can be
trusted a great deal by more than 2 percentage points. The group 50-64 is less skeptical
(coefficient is never statistically significant). No gender differences have been found. On the
other hand, we find that married and separated people have ceteris paribus a lower trust in the
UN, while students, retired people and part time employed individuals have a higher trust in
the UN than full time employed ones. Formal education shows a tendency for a positive
impact on the level of trust. Informal education or in other words political interest is also
positively correlated with trust in the UN. The first two estimations indicate that an increase
in the level of political interest increases the probability of stating that the UN can be trusted a
great deal by 1 percentage point. However, the coefficient loses its statistical significance
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after including political trust. Interestingly, we observe a non-linear effect of the economic
situation group variable. The middle class shows the highest values of trust in the UN. Table 1
also shows that risk attitudes don’t affect trust in the UN. Looking at the first two estimations
we can conclude that church attendance is positively correlated with a higher trust in the UN.
On the other hand, once we control for political trust, the coefficient switches its sign without
losing its statistical significance and therefore giving stronger support, for example, to the
competition argument. However, it should be noted that the marginal effects are not very
high.
In Table 2 we extend the previous specification including also ideology (5). As can be
seen, the number of observations strongly decreases, which justifies the sequential integration
of this variable. Contrary to our expectations the coefficient of the results is statistically not
significant and has a negative sign. We will therefore proceed without controlling for
ideology in the next specifications. In the estimates (6) to (8) we investigate regional
differences. In line with our prediction we observe that developed countries have the lowest
level of trust in the UN; Western societies appear to be more critical of the UN. However,
these results should be interpreted with due caution as the number of countries in each region
is limited. In specification (7) and (8) we include the index of globalization. As not all 38
countries are covered by the index of globalization, the number of observations also
decreases.

The coefficient is statistically significant with a positive sign. The marginal

effects show that an index increase by one unit raises the probability of reporting the highest
trust in the UN level by 2.3 percentage points. Globalization matters quite significantly. It can
be criticized that including an aggregated country variable such as globalization produces
downward biased standard errors (see, e.g., discussion in Frey and Stutzer 2000). Thus, we
present standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries in specification (8). This allows to
take into account heteroscedasticity. Clustering generally leads to a decrease in the z-values,
but has no impact on the marginal effects. Table 2 shows that the coefficient is still
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statistically significant. Previously obtained results regarding our key variables remain robust.
Thus, we can conclude that hypothesis 6 cannot be rejected.
In Table 3 we report the effect of the independent variables in the four regions.17 It can
be argued that the observed effects in the previous estimations might be driven by one of the
regions. It is also possible that some variables act differently in the different regions.
Moreover, we test hypotheses 3 and 4 with this approach and find, according to our
prediction, a negative correlation between corruption and trust in the UN for developed
countries and a positive one between corruption and trust in the UN in developing and
transition countries. The strongest effect can be observed for CEE and FSU countries. The
transformation of the socialist economies was one of the main reasons for the surging interest
in corruption since institutional weaknesses and corruption surfaced as major obstacles to
market reforms (Abed and Gupta, 2002). Levin and Satarov (2000), e.g., analyze corruption
and institutions in Russia. They criticize that corruption is an integral part of Russia’s
economy. Corruption has the negative consequence that citizens reduce their trust in the
authority. Levin and Satarov state that the degree of corruption exceeds the total expenditures
on science, education, health care, culture, and art. In some industrial branches criminal
groups spend up to 50% of their revenues to bribe officials (p. 115). In sum, the results in
Table 3 indicate that hypothesis 3 and 4 cannot be rejected. Looking at the other key factors
we also find that political trust has a positive impact on one dependent variable. The
coefficients are highly statistically significant in all four regions. These results are in line with
hypothesis 1 as well. On the other hand, social trust has a positive impact in Western societies
and in CEE and FSU countries, but a negative one in Latin America and Asia. Thus, social
trust does not have a consistent positive impact at the regional level, providing therefore only
partial support for hypothesis 2. Table 3 also shows a positive correlation between the
variable cosmopolitan and trust in the UN. Interestingly, the strongest effect can be observed
17

Africa has not been considered independently, as Nigeria was the only African country in the data set.
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in CEE/FSU and Asian countries. We can also observe regional differences for other
variables. For example, it is interesting to note that only in CEE/FSU the coefficient upper
class is statistically significant with a negative and high marginal effects. People who became
rich might have been able to secure or establish their property rights after the rapid collapse of
institutional structures that produced a vacuum in the country, followed by worsening income
inequality and poverty rates. Their ability to succeed in such a system reduces their trust in
international organizations which could change or affect their current situation. Another
interesting finding is that risk aversion is relevant in Asian countries only, showing a positive
correlation with trust in the UN. In sum, regional difference of the independent variables
supports the relevance of investigating the regions independently.
Brewer et al. (2004, 2005) stress in their model that the causality runs from social and
political trust to international trust. However, it can be criticized that social and political trust
are endogenous. We conducted several 2SLS estimations providing detailed diagnostic tests
to check the robustness of the results. The results are presented in Table 4. In a first step we
include only social trust in specification (13). The coefficient is statistically significant with a
positive sign. In a next step we include the political trust and globalization index. Here the
results are also consistent with the previous ones. Social trust is not statistically significant
anymore. On the other hand, political trust and globalization have a strong impact on our
dependent variable. In specification (14) we test the importance of all three sub-factors for
globalization, namely political, economic and social globalization. Dreher (2006) stresses in
his growth paper that it is not obvious that all dimensions of globalization affect economic
performance in the same direction. When including all three factors in the specification he
finds support that economic globalization has the strongest impact on the GDP per capita
growth rate. Interestingly, we find similar results when investigating trust in the UN.
Economic globalization has the strongest impact on trust in the UN, showing a positive sign.
Political globalization is also positively correlated with trust in the UN at the 5% level. On the
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other hand, we find a negative correlation between social globalization and trust in the UN
(on the border of being statistically significant). This shows that different dimensions of
globalization affect trust in the UN in different ways. Table 4 also indicates that individuals’
geographic identification has a strong and robust impact on their trust in the UN. Finally, we
also find the tendency that corruption is positively correlated with trust in the UN, a result that
we observed for developing and transition countries.
Table 4 reports that we use two variables, namely one variable that measures social
preferences and another that measures individuals’ satisfaction with life as instruments for
social trust18. Political trust is instrumented through an index that measures the justifiability of
tax evasion and claiming government benefits without being entitled to19. We report the firststage regression results of the instrumental variables and the F-tests of the exclusion of the
instruments. Overall, the used instruments are very effective in explaining social and political
trust. The instruments for social and political trust are always statistically significant at the 1%
level, so are the F-tests for the instrument exclusion set in the first-stage regressions. We also
report the Anderson canonical correlations LR test for the relevance of excluded instruments.
A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the model is identified and that the
instruments are relevant (see Hall, Rudebusch and Wilcox 1996). We also report the
Anderson-Rubin test that the endogenous variables are jointly statistically significant. The test
has the advantage of being robust to the presence of weak instruments. Table 4 reports that in
all cases the Anderson canonical correlations LR test shows rejection of the null hypothesis,
which indicates that the models are identified and that the instruments are relevant. Similarly,
the Anderson-Rubin test is also statistically significant. We also present the Hansen J test for
18

Questions: To build good human relationships, it is most important to try to understand others' preferences
(value 1); To build good relationships, it is most important to express one's own preferences
clearly. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? (1=dissatisfied,
10=satisfied).
19
Question: Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified,
never be justified, or something in between: ..... Cheating on taxes if you have the chance. Claiming government
benefits to which you are not entitled ( 10=“never justified” , 1= always). Index: sum of both questions, scale
from 1 to 20.
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over-identification to examine the validity of the exclusion restrictions. In all the cases, this
test fails to reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid, which supports their
validity.

5. Concluding Remarks
In the last couple of years, the number of social capital studies has been growing. However,
Brewer et al. (2004) criticize the lack of empirical studies that have analyzed international
trust and urge that social and political trust are not the only forms of trust future research
should study. Starting from this argument this paper investigates the determinants of trust in
international organizations with a special focus on the United Nations. We extend the
previous approach in several ways: 1) First we extend the previous empirical models
including factors such as globalization, institutional quality (corruption) and geographic
identity, 2) we have worked with a broader data set that covers not less than 38 countries with
a cross-section of individuals from the World Values Survey wave III (1995-1997) rather than
just the US, 3) contrary to previous studies we also apply an instrumental approach to
discussiing endogeneity problems, and 4) we have investigated different dimensions of
political trust. Previously, political trust has been proxied as trust in the government. In our
case, we have also investigated trust in the legal system, in the parliament and the political
parties. This allows to take into account the multidimensional current politico-economic
process and also the trust at the constitutional level, focusing therefore additionally on how
the relationship between the state and its citizens is established. The results provide strong
support for the importance of political trust. The index and all the four factors have a strong
and robust impact on our dependent variable. These results indicate strong externalities.
People who are cynical about domestic politics are also more cynical about international
institutions. Citizens who believe that their own government does not fulfill their expectations
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may reason that international bodies may even be less able to satisfy their preferences. The
results remain robust after conducting several 2SLS estimations. We also observe the
tendency that social trust matters. However, once we control for political trust, the significant
impact of social trust disappears. The results also show that a higher level of (perceived)
corruption reduces trust in the UN in developed countries, but increases trust in developing
and transition countries. In line with previous studies such as Dreher and Schneider (2006) the
results support the usefulness of investigating cause and consequences of corruption in
developed and developing countries separately. We also find that geographic identification
affects trust in the UN. A stronger identification with the world as a whole leads to a higher
trust in the UN. Moreover, we find the international environment a country faces to be a key
factor as well. Countries’ capacity to act globally by creating international networks
guaranteeing information, goods and capital flows increases the demand for international
stability, and the goal of avoiding a dangerous international environment supports
international trust or in our case trust in UN. This aspect has been neglected in the previous
literature. An interesting new data set by Dreher (2006) based on 23 variables allows to
investigate this aspect. The results also show that not all dimensions of globalization affect
trust in the same manner. Strong positive effects are observable for economic and political
globalization or integration, but not for social globalization.
It is worthwhile to mention that one advantage of the data set is that different cultural
regions can be investigated, i.e. we can assess the cross-culture robustness of our investigated
variables in different environments. We find not only regional differences, namely a higher
trust in the UN among developing and transition countries, but also certain differences among
the determinants that shape trust in the UN.
We should note that the nature of trust in the UN might differ when we investigate
different parts of the UN. Our question measures the general confidence in the UN, but it may
be interesting to focus also on specific factors such as trust in the Secretary-General, the
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United Nations Secretariat, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and
Social Council, the Trusteeship Council or the International Court of Justice. The complex
nature of the UN requires a multi-dimensional approach to fully understand the level of trust
in such an international institution. Moreover, it would be highly interesting to observe the
level of trust in the UN over time, as international organizations are also affected by changes.
So, reforms are interesting aspects to investigate as e.g. the proposals for an overhaul of the
United Nations Secretariat Kofi Annan presented in March 2006. In his opinion the
organization’s rules, systems and culture need significant retooling and investment
(http://www.un.org/reform/). If these reforms are realized, it will be highly interesting to
investigate how such changes affect citizens’ trust.
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Table 1 Trust in the UN
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT Coeff
a) Demographic Factors
AGE 30-49
AGE 50-64
AGE 65+
FEMALE
b) Education
FORMAL
c) Politics/Informal Educ.
POLITICAL INTEREST
d) Marital Status
MARRIED
WIDOWED
DIVORCED
SEPARATED
e) Economic Variables
UPPER CLASS
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS
LOWER MIDDLE CLASS
f) Employment Status
PART TIME EMPLOYED
SELFEMPLOYED
UNEMPLOYED
AT HOME
STUDENT
RETIRED
OTHER
g) Risk Attitudes
RISK AVERSE
h) Religiosity
CHURCH ATTENDANCE
i) Institutional Quality
CORRUPTION
j) Social and Political Trust
OTHERS
POLITICAL TRUST INDEX
LEGAL SYSTEM
GOVERNMENT
POLITICAL PARTIES
PARLIAMENT
k) Geographic Identification
COSMOPOLITAN
Country Fixed Effects
Pseudo R2
Number of observations
Prob > chi2

z-Stat. Marg. Coeff.
(1)

-0.071***-4.13
-0.021
-0.92
-0.108***-3.07
-0.017
-1.25
0.003

z-Stat. Marg. Coeff.
(2)

-0.015-0.073***-4.15
-0.005-0.025
-1.06
-0.022-0.110***-3.09
-0.004-0.020
-1.45

0.81 0.001 0.002

z-Stat.Marg. Coeff.
(3)

-0.016 -0.058***-3.20
-0.005 -0.024
-1.03
-0.023 -0.147***-4.10
-0.004 -0.015
-1.07

-0.012
-0.005
-0.027
-0.003

z-Stat.Marg.
(4)

-0.058***-3.19
-0.025
-1.04
-0.146***-4.09
-0.015
-1.04

-0.012
-0.005
-0.027
-0.003

0.63 0.00050.014*** 4.04 0.003 0.014*** 3.81 0.003

0.046*** 6.09 0.010 0.046*** 5.89 0.010 -0.008

-1.03 -0.002 -0.005

-0.67 -0.001

-0.029* -1.66 -0.006-0.030* -1.70 -0.007 -0.037**
-0.031
-0.95 -0.007-0.026
-0.81 -0.006 -0.037
-0.050
-1.47 -0.011-0.041
-1.19 -0.009 -0.031
-0.092* -1.91 -0.019-0.091* -1.86 -0.019 -0.096*

-2.02
-1.10
-0.85
-1.90

-2.07
-1.20
-0.85
-1.92

-0.007
-0.007
-0.006
-0.018

-0.038**
-0.040
-0.031
-0.097*

-0.008
-0.008
-0.006
-0.018

0.050
0.95 0.011 0.041
0.76 0.009 -0.003
-0.06 -0.001 -0.005
-0.09 -0.001
0.137*** 7.30 0.031 0.136*** 7.15 0.031 0.085*** 4.37 0.018 0.084*** 4.28 0.017
0.048*** 3.25 0.010 0.050*** 3.38 0.011 0.022
1.45 0.004 0.021
1.39 0.004
0.050**
0.025
-0.017
0.043*
0.072**
0.060**
0.010

2.08
1.06
-0.71
1.80
2.59
2.19
0.23

0.011 0.052**
0.006 0.029
-0.004-0.016
0.010 0.048**
0.016 0.074***
0.013 0.069**
0.002 0.018

0.013

0.98 0.003 0.020

2.15
1.22
-0.64
1.98
2.62
2.48
0.42

0.012 0.045*
0.006 0.039
-0.003 -0.010
0.011 0.026
0.017 0.082***
0.016 0.049*
0.004 -0.002

1.44 0.004 0.012

1.80
1.57
-0.41
1.03
2.82
1.73
-0.04

0.009 0.046*
0.008 0.038
-0.002 -0.010
0.005 0.025
0.017 0.081***
0.010 0.049*
-0.0003-0.001

1.83
1.56
-0.41
1.02
2.79
1.73
-0.02

0.009
0.008
-0.002
0.005
0.017
0.010
-0.0002

0.87 0.002 0.012

0.83 0.002

0.018*** 4.96 0.004 0.016*** 4.39 0.004 -0.001

-0.17 -0.0001-0.001

-0.20 -0.0002

-0.115***-13.09-0.025-0.110***-12.34-0.024 0.002

0.18 0.0003 0.003

0.35 0.001

0.089*** 6.09 0.020 0.024
1.58 0.005 0.022
0.159*** 49.85 0.032
0.166***
0.124***
0.115***
0.228***

1.45 0.004
16.80 0.033
10.73 0.025
9.56 0.023
18.02 0.046

0.018*** 3.67 0.004 0.018*** 3.55 0.004 0.022*** 4.18 0.004 0.022*** 4.14 0.004
YES
YES
YES
YES
0.046
36245
0.000

0.046
35078
0.000

0.090
33423
0.000

0.091
33423
0.000

Notes: Robust standard errors. In the reference group are AGE<30, MALE, SINGLE, LOWEST/WORKING
CLASS, FULL TIME EMPLOYED, RISK TAKERS. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level.
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Table 2 Further determinants of trust in the UN
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT Coeff
a) Demographic Factors
AGE 30-49
AGE 50-64
AGE 65+
FEMALE
b) Education
FORMAL
c) Politics
POLITICAL INTEREST
IDEOLOGY (RIGHTIST)
d) Marital Status
MARRIED
WIDOWED
DIVORCED
SEPARATED
e) Economic Variables
UPPER CLASS
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS
LOWER MIDDLE CLASS
f) Employment Status
PART TIME EMPLOYED
SELFEMPLOYED
UNEMPLOYED
AT HOME
STUDENT
RETIRED
OTHER
g) Risk Attitudes
RISK AVERSE
h) Religiosity
CHURCH ATTENDANCE
i) Institutional Quality
CORRUPTION
j) Social and Political Trust
OTHERS
POLITICAL TRUST INDEX
LEGAL SYSTEM
GOVERNMENT
POLITICAL PARTIES
PARLIAMENT
k) Geographic Identification
COSMOPOLITAN
l) Globalization
INDEX GLOBALIZATION
l) Regions
CEE and FSU
LATIN AMERICA
ASIA
AFRICA
Country fixed effects
Pseudo R2
Number of observations
Prob > chi2

z-Stat.Marg. Coeff.
(5)

-0.065***-3.33
-0.021
-0.82
-0.149***-3.81
-0.011
-0.72

z-Stat.Marg. Coeff.
(6)

-0.013-0.071***-4.01
-0.004-0.039
-1.67
-0.028-0.144***-4.09
-0.0020.015
1.06

z-Stat.Marg. Coeff.
(7)

-0.015 -0.059***-2.95
-0.008 -0.012
-0.44
-0.029 -0.135***-3.40
0.003 0.009
0.54

z-Stat.Marg.
(8)

-0.012-0.059* -1.81
-0.002-0.012 -0.31
-0.026-0.135***-2.94
0.002 0.009
0.26

-0.012
-0.002
-0.026
0.002

0.012*** 3.03 0.002 0.034*** 10.79 0.007 0.038*** 10.85 0.008 0.038** 2.35 0.008
-0.015* -1.74 -0.0030.008
0.003
0.84 0.001

1.10 0.002 -0.004

-0.41 -0.001-0.004

-0.036* -1.87 -0.007-0.034* -1.92 -0.007 -0.071***-3.63
-0.042
-1.16 -0.008-0.039
-1.22 -0.008 -0.099***-2.72
-0.021
-0.55 -0.004-0.009
-0.27 -0.002 -0.035
-0.88
-0.100* -1.85 -0.019-0.073
-1.47 -0.015 -0.126** -2.36

-0.20 -0.001

-0.014-0.071***-3.05
-0.019-0.099***-2.62
-0.007-0.035 -0.77
-0.024-0.126** -2.20

-0.014
-0.019
-0.007
-0.024

0.019
0.32 0.004 -0.201***-3.75 -0.038 -0.114* -1.84 -0.022-0.114
0.088*** 4.23 0.019 0.020
1.07 0.004 0.021
1.03 0.004 0.021
0.020
1.21 0.004 0.027* 1.80 0.006 0.024
1.40 0.005 0.024

-1.54 -0.022
0.53 0.004
0.89 0.005

0.047*
0.032
-0.006
0.026
0.085***
0.066**
0.011

1.75
1.23
-0.20
0.94
2.71
2.12
0.22

1.30
0.21
-0.09
0.35
0.74
1.35
-1.73

0.013

0.89 0.003 0.004

0.33 0.001 -0.003

-0.22 -0.001-0.003

-0.18 -0.001

-0.0002

-0.04 0.000 -0.007*

-1.93 -0.001 -0.015***-3.80 -0.003-0.015

-1.39 -0.003

0.014

1.40 0.003 0.025*** 2.89 0.005 0.016*

1.65 0.003 0.016

0.88 0.003

0.025

1.50 0.005 0.024

1.63 0.005 0.003

0.21 0.001 0.003

0.10 0.001

0.160***
0.130***
0.108***
0.229***

14.99 0.033
10.47 0.027
8.34 0.022
16.84 0.047

17.02 0.034
12.00 0.028
6.68 0.017
16.18 0.042

14.75 0.032
12.33 0.032
7.27 0.020
15.77 0.045

10.05 0.032
5.79 0.032
4.49 0.020
9.50 0.045

0.010 0.021
0.007 0.018
-0.0010.001
0.005 -0.005
0.018 0.019
0.014 0.081***
0.002 -0.041

0.162***
0.133***
0.078***
0.199***

0.87
0.76
0.05
-0.21
0.66
2.90
-0.94

0.005 0.048*
0.004 0.009
0.0002-0.003
-0.001 0.012
0.004 0.031
0.018 0.047
-0.008 -0.130**

0.159***
0.158***
0.100***
0.225***

1.71
0.32
-0.10
0.45
0.97
1.48
-2.62

0.010 0.048
0.002 0.009
-0.001-0.003
0.003 0.012
0.006 0.031
0.010 0.047
-0.024-0.130*

0.159***
0.158***
0.100***
0.225***

0.010
0.002
-0.001
0.003
0.006
0.010
-0.024

0.019*** 3.36 0.004 0.032*** 6.35 0.007 0.021*** 3.77 0.004 0.021*

1.76 0.004

0.116*** 7.50 0.023 0.116*

1.70 0.023

YES
0.091
28722
0.000

0.155***
0.205***
0.401***
0.507***
NO
0.058
33423
0.000

9.35 0.034
9.69 0.047
18.27 0.100
7.88 0.138

0.343***
0.352***
0.629***
0.766***
NO
0.070
26660
0.000

12.40 0.077
12.60 0.078
18.99 0.161
10.56 0.220

0.343*** 3.07
0.352*** 2.93
0.629*** 3.23
0.766*** 5.11
clustering over
0.070
26660
0.000

0.077
0.078
0.161
0.220
countries

Notes: Robust standard errors. In the reference group are AGE<30, MALE, SINGLE, LOWEST/WORKING
CLASS, FULL TIME EMPLOYED, RISK TAKERS, WESTERN EUROPE/USA/AUSTRALIA. *,** and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 3 Regional differences
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT Coeff

z-Stat. Marg. Coeff.
z-Stat. Marg. Coeff.
z-Stat.Marg. Coeff.
z-Stat.Marg.
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
Western Europe, USA, CEE and FSU
Latin American
Asian countries
Australia
countries
countries

a) Demographic Factors
AGE 30-49
AGE 50-64
AGE 65+
FEMALE
b) Education
FORMAL
c) Politics/Informal Educ.
POLITICAL INTEREST
d) Marital Status
MARRIED
WIDOWED
DIVORCED
SEPARATED
e) Economic Variables
UPPER CLASS
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS
LOWER MIDDLE CLASS
f) Employment Status
PART TIME EMPLOYED
SELFEMPLOYED
UNEMPLOYED
AT HOME
STUDENT
RETIRED
OTHER
g) Risk Attitudes
RISK AVERSE
h) Religiosity
CHURCH ATTENDANCE
i) Institutional Quality
CORRUPTION
j) Social and Political Trust
OTHERS
POLITICAL TRUST INDEX
LEGAL SYSTEM
GOVERNMENT
POLITICAL PARTIES
PARLIAMENT
k) Geographic Identification
COSMOPOLITAN
Pseudo R2
Number of observations
Prob > chi2

-0.121***-3.31
-0.093** -2.00
-0.172** -2.59
0.107*** 3.87
-0.007

-0.014-0.137***-4.80
-0.011-0.114***-3.07
-0.019-0.216***-3.80
0.013 -0.012
-0.57

-0.029 -0.012
-0.31
-0.024 0.040
0.76
-0.042 -0.061
-0.74
-0.003 -0.088***-2.71

-0.003
0.010
-0.015
-0.022

0.062
0.076
-0.090
0.060

-1.14 -0.0010.058*** 11.03 0.013 0.054*** 7.09 0.014 -0.012

1.40
1.17
-0.73
1.46

0.018
0.023
-0.026
0.018

-1.26 -0.004

-0.039***-2.64 -0.0050.031** 2.42 0.007 0.008

0.49 0.002 0.051** 2.34 0.015

-0.093***-2.73
-0.139** -2.00
0.0002 0.00
0.065
0.73

-2.07
-2.08
-1.75
-2.15

-0.0110.078***
-0.0150.113**
0.000 0.099*
0.008 0.070

2.65
2.21
1.84
0.82

0.017
0.026
0.023
0.016

-0.077**
-0.170**
-0.150*
-0.171**

-0.019
-0.039
-0.035
-0.040

-0.143***-2.94
0.057
0.73
-0.392* -1.70
-0.105
-0.48

-0.043
0.017
-0.097
-0.030

0.027
0.026
-0.054*

0.23 0.003 -0.414***-4.50 -0.071 -0.118
-0.82 -0.028 -0.076
-0.67 -0.022
0.76 0.003 -0.060* -1.80 -0.013 0.100** 2.14 0.026 0.105** 2.02 0.031
-1.80 -0.0060.007
0.30 0.001 0.111*** 3.41 0.028 0.027
0.59 0.008

0.115**
-0.090*
-0.018
-0.008
0.060
0.058
-0.114

2.59
-1.70
-0.33
-0.16
1.01
1.09
-0.95

-0.010

-0.37 -0.0010.015

0.015 -0.024
-0.010-0.005
-0.002-0.006
-0.0010.027
0.008 -0.100
0.007 0.127***
-0.0130.127**

-0.027***-4.33 -0.0030.010*

-0.61
-0.10
-0.16
0.57
-1.95
3.02
2.23

-0.005 -0.103*
-0.001 -0.044
-0.001 0.045
0.006 -0.008
-0.021 0.063
0.029 0.020
0.029 -0.228**

-1.85
-0.96
0.77
-0.17
1.09
0.29
-2.29

-0.025
-0.011
0.012
-0.002
0.016
0.005
-0.051

-0.046
0.183***
0.033
0.047
0.033
0.071
-0.177*

-0.64
3.51
0.48
0.77
0.47
0.52
-1.81

-0.013
0.056
0.010
0.014
0.010
0.021
-0.048

0.64 0.003 -0.030

-0.96 -0.007 0.093*** 2.60 0.027

1.65 0.002 0.004

0.61 0.001 -0.015

-1.60 -0.005

1.73 0.008 0.007

0.30 0.002

-0.043** -2.47 -0.0050.064*** 4.36 0.014 0.031*

0.117*** 4.45 0.014 0.065*** 2.77 0.014 -0.165***-4.17 -0.039 -0.173***-3.82 -0.049
0.180***
0.091***
0.197***
0.262***

9.46
3.92
7.75
10.09

0.022
0.011
0.024
0.032

0.171***
0.109***
0.064***
0.146***

11.19
6.27
3.68
7.74

0.037
0.024
0.014
0.032

0.136***
0.211***
0.055**
0.248***

0.017
0.070
8842
0.000

1.63 0.002 0.064*** 8.39 0.014 0.013
0.043
0.073
13031
6053
0.000
0.000

6.98 0.034
9.94 0.053
2.22 0.014
10.05 0.062

0.143***
0.168***
0.055
0.170***

5.32
5.05
1.64
5.05

0.042
0.049
0.016
0.050

1.14 0.003 0.045*** 2.96 0.013
0.049
4118
0.000

Notes: Robust standard errors. In the reference group are AGE<30, MALE, SINGLE, LOWEST/WORKING
CLASS, FULL TIME EMPLOYED, RISK TAKERS, WESTERN EUROPE/USA/AUSTRALIA. *,** and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Table 4 2SLS estimations
2SLS
a) Demographic Factors
AGE 30-49
AGE 50-64
AGE 65+
FEMALE
b) Education
FORMAL
c) Politics
POLITICAL INTEREST
d) Marital Status
MARRIED
WIDOWED
DIVORCED
SEPARATED
e) Economic Variables
UPPER CLASS
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS
LOWER MIDDLE CLASS
f) Employment Status
PART TIME EMPLOYED
SELFEMPLOYED
UNEMPLOYED
AT HOME
STUDENT
RETIRED
OTHER
g) Risk Attitudes
RISK AVERSE
h) Religiosity
CHURCH ATTENDANCE
i) Institutional Quality
CORRUPTION
j) Social and Political Trust
OTHERS
POLITICAL TRUST INDEX
k) Geographic Identification
COSMOPOLITAN
l) Globalization
INDEX GLOBALIZATION
POLITICAL GLOBALIZATION
SOCIAL GLOBALIZATION
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION
l) Regions
CEE and FSU
LATIN AMERICA
ASIA
AFRICA
First stage regressions:
TRUSTING OTHERS
Social preferences
Satisfaction
F-Test of excluded instruments
POLITICAL TRUST INDEX
Tax / Gov. Benefit Morale
F-Test of excluded instruments
Anderson canon. corr. likelihood ratio stat.
Anderson-Rubin test
Hansen J statistic
Number of observations
Prob > F

Coeff.
(13)

t-statist.

Coeff.
(14)

t-statist.

Coeff.
(15)

t-statist.

-0.108***
-0.089***
-0.146***
-0.021

-6.11
-3.64
-4.12
-1.50

-0.061***
-0.015
-0.105***
-0.017

-3.12
-0.61
-3.13
-1.22

-0.060***
-0.018
-0.112***
-0.019

-3.09
-0.73
-3.32
-1.38

0.014***

4.05

0.041***

7.31

0.043***

7.55

0.013

1.41

-0.044***

-2.81

-0.044***

-2.79

0.010
0.024
-0.032
-0.013

0.57
0.76
-0.92
-0.27

-0.049***
-0.077**
-0.018
-0.081*

-2.83
-2.36
-0.56
-1.87

-0.047***
-0.073**
-0.016
-0.080*

-2.69
-2.18
-0.48
-1.83

-0.145***
0.013
0.035**

-2.76
0.63
2.40

-0.118**
-0.033
-0.004

-2.18
-1.43
-0.28

-0.112**
-0.029
-0.006

-2.06
-1.25
-0.38

-0.036
0.001
0.038
0.028
0.015
0.121***
-0.005

-1.35
0.05
1.56
1.14
0.53
4.23
-0.12

-0.002
0.000
0.010
-0.028
0.004
0.014
-0.060

-0.09
-0.01
0.39
-1.09
0.13
0.45
-1.47

0.000
-0.001
0.004
-0.024
0.002
0.012
-0.057

-0.01
-0.06
0.17
-0.96
0.07
0.40
-1.41

0.039**

2.42

-0.003

-0.17

-0.007

-0.40

0.016***

4.69

-0.007

-1.36

-0.006

-1.21

-0.007

-0.44

0.068***

2.66

0.073***

2.85

1.219***

5.91

0.204
0.186***

0.80
4.96

0.130
0.195***

0.50
5.21

0.042***

7.89

0.025***

4.78

0.026***

5.04

0.034**

2.19
0.023**
-0.018*
0.072***

2.48
-1.67
4.45

0.267***
0.329***
0.626***
0.572***

10.00
7.97
14.05
9.51

0.130***
0.165***
0.087
0.358***

2.79
2.85
0.66
4.23

0.129***
0.137**
0.122
0.451***

2.81
2.16
0.89
4.89

0.051****
0.008****
79.76****

9.96
7.61

0.049***
0.007***
31.17***

7.74
5.29

0.046***
0.007***
30.78***

7.30
5.80

0.033***
37.36***
63.741***
11.92***
0.035
21988
0.000

6.80

0.033***
38.33***
61.036***
12.590***
0.026
21988
0.000

6.80

171.145***
21.68***
0.349
31435
0.000

Notes: Robust standard errors. In the reference group are GE<30, MALE, SINGLE, LOWEST/WORKING CLASS,
FULL TIME EMPLOYED, RISK TAKERS, WESTERN EUROPE/USA/AUSTRALIA. *,** and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. CEE/FSU: Central Eastern Europ. and Former Soviet Union
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APPENDIX

Table A1 Description of Variables
Variable

Derivation

AGE

DUMMIES
AGE 30-49, AGE 50-64, 65+ (reference group, AGE < 30)
FEMALE (MALE in the reference group)

GENDER
EDUCATION

Continuous variable
What is the highest educational level that you have attained?
1. No formal education
2. Incomplete primary school
3. Completed primary school
4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type
5. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type
6. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type
7. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type
8. Some university-level education, without degree
9. University-level education, with degree

RISK AVERSE

Now I would like to ask you something about the things which would seem to
you personally, most important if you were looking a job. Here are some of the
things many people take into account in relation to their work. Regardless of
whether you’re actually looking for a job, which one would you, personally,
place first if you were looking for a job?
1. A good income so that you do not have any worries about money
2. A safe job with no risk of closing down or unemployment
3. Working with people you like
4. Doing an important job which gives you a feeling of accomplishment
And what would be your second choice?
A dummy variable was built with the value 1, if someone has chosen 2 as first or
as second choice.

CHURCH ATTENDANCE

Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend
religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month,
only on special holy days, once a year, less often, never or practically never. (7 =
more than once a week to 1 = never or practically never)

ECONOMIC CLASS

People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the
middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as
belonging to the:

EMPLOYMENT STATUS

CORRUPTION

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper51

DUMMY: UPPER CLASS, the rest (middle class, working class and lower
class) is the reference group.
DUMMY: SELFEMPLOYED, the rest (unemployed, part time and full-time
employed, at home, student, retired, other) is in the reference group.
To assess the level of perceived corruption from the WVS, we use the following
question:
How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country?
Almost no public officials are engaged in it (1)
A few public officials are engaged in it (2)
Most public officials are engaged in it (3)
Almost all public officials are engaged in it (4)
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TRUST

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
can’t be too careful in your dealings with people? (1=most people can be trusted,
0=can’t be too careful).

TRUST IN THE SYSTEM

Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the legal system: Do you
have a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much
confidence or no confidence at all? (4=a great deal of confidence to 1=no
confidence at all).

TRUST IN GOVERNMENT

Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the government in your
capital: Do you have a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not
very much confidence or no confidence at all? (4=a great deal of confidence to
1=no confidence at all).

TRUST IN PARLIAMENT

Could you tell me how much confidence you have in parliament: Do you have a
great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or
no confidence at all? (4=a great deal of confidence to 1=no confidence at all).

TRUST

IN

PARTIES

POLITICAL Could you tell me how much confidence you have in political parties: Do you
have a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much
confidence or no confidence at all? (4=a great deal of confidence to 1=no
confidence at all).

INDEX TRUST IN THE Sum of all four trust in the state factors (scale from 1 to 16).
STATE
COSMOPOLITAN

To which of these geographic groups would you say you belong first of all?
Locality or town where you live (1)
(GEOGRAPHIC IDENTITY)
State or region of country where you live (2)
Country as a whole (3)
Continent (4)
The world as a whole (5)
RIGHTIST
ORIENTATION

POLITICAL In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you
place your views on this scale, generally speaking? Scale from 1 to 10.

OVERALL
GLOBALIZATION INDEX

ECONOMIC
GLOBALIZATION
(SOURCE: DREHER 2006)

Data year 1995, covering the following dimensions: economic globalzation,
political globalization and social globalization (Dreher 2006)

i) Data on Actual Flows
Trade (percent of GDP)
Foreign Direct Investment (percent of GDP)
Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP)
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP)
ii) Data on Restrictions
Hidden Import Barriers
Mean Tariff Rate
Taxes on International Trade (percent of current revenue)
Capital Account Restrictions

POLITICAL
GLOBALIZATION
(SOURCE: DREHER 2006)

Embassies in Country
Membership in International Organizations
Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions
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SOCIAL GLOBALIZATION
(SOURCE DREHER 2006)

i) Data on Personal Contact
Outgoing Telephone Traffic
Transfers (percent of GDP)
International Tourism
Telephone Average Cost of Call to US
Foreign Population (percent of total population)
ii) Data on Information Flows
Telephone Mainlines (per 1000 people)
Internet Hosts (per capita)
Internet Users (share of population)
Cable Television (per 1000 people)
Daily Newspapers (per 1000 people)
Radios (per 1000 people)
iii) Data on Cultural Proximity
Number of McDonald's Restaurants (per 100,000 people)

Source: Inglehart et al. (2000) and Dreher (2006).
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Table A2
Countries in the Sample (38 countries)
countries
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Belarus
Bosnia-Hercegovina
Brazil
Bulgaria
Chile
China
Croatia
Estonia
Finland
Georgia
India
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia

Mexico
Moldova
Nigeria.
Norway
Peru
Philippines
Russia
Serbia
Slovenia
South Korea
Spain
Switzerland
Taiwan
Ukraine
Uruguay
USA
Venezuela
Western Germanya
Eastern Germanya

Notes: aThe data provides the possibility to differentiate between
East and West Germany.
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